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LOSING MY RELIGION: THE PLACE OF 
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN CLINICAL  
LEGAL EDUCATION 
Praveen Kosuri* 
Abstract: Many law school clinics presume a “social justice” mission—that 
is, representation of the indigent and under-represented about poverty 
law issues—as the only legitimate goal for clinic clients and matters. This 
Article contends that social justice should not be presumed, but rather 
should be considered an option—among many—to include in a clinic’s 
pedagogy. If increased experiential learning opportunities for students 
are a real objective, and clinics are the pinnacle of those opportunities, 
then broadening the portfolio of clinical offerings to include those that 
are not focused on social justice should be a valid proposition. The mod-
ern clinical legal education movement that began with Ford Foundation-
funded clinics has moved from the fringe to the center of legal education. 
This Article urges that it is incumbent on the leaders of those clinical 
programs to accommodate different models of clinics, thereby expanding 
clinical education to more students and unleashing the next phase of in-
novation and creativity in law school education. 
Introduction 
 Many of today’s clinical law faculty members presume that “social 
justice” should be a fundamental characteristic of any clinical offering.1 
In fact, if you attend a clinical conference, you will hear clinicians 
 
© 2012, Praveen Kosuri. 
* Practice Associate Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and 
Director of its Entrepreneurship Legal Clinic. 
1 See Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 Clinical L. Rev. 355, 
360 (2008); Jon C. Dubin, Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L. Rev. 1461, 
1473–74 (1998). Social justice is rarely defined in clinical education conversations, and 
there is often an assumption that everyone is talking about the same thing. For the most 
part, it is the assistance of low-income individuals and communities who cannot afford 
market rate lawyers or have limited access to them. From there, it ranges from individual 
client representation on “small” matters and “impact” litigation to collective mobilization 
of disenfranchised constituencies. See Ashar, supra, at 368; Juliet M. Brodie, Little Cases on 
the Middle Ground: Teaching Social Justice Lawyering in Neighborhood-Based Community Lawyering 
Clinics, 15 Clinical L. Rev. 333, 335–36 (2009); Dubin, supra, at 1475; Stephen Wizner & 
Jane Aiken, Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law School Clinics in Enhancing Access to Justice, 73 
Fordham L. Rev. 997, 997, 1011 (2004). 
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proudly extol the social good their clinics do and the audience dutifully 
applaud this ideology. Rarely, if ever, will you hear any comment about 
a clinic that does not at least presume social justice.2 This is under-
standable on many levels. First, no one wants to be perceived as against 
“doing good” or helping the underprivileged. Second, the audiences at 
these conferences tend to be peers of the speakers doing the extolling 
and themselves conduct similar work. To criticize the social justice 
component of that work would be anathema, not to mention self-
defeating. Social justice, after all, is what the modern clinical move-
ment is based on, and clinicians who criticize that concept would be 
biting the hand that feeds them. 
 Without the influx of civil rights and poverty law lawyers into law 
schools during the late 1960s and 1970s, clinical legal education as we 
know it would not exist.3 Those lawyers became the founders of mod-
ern clinical education. When they entered the academy, not every law 
school in the country had a clinical program.4 There were no Associa-
tion of American Law Schools (AALS) standards for clinical educa-
tion.5 The national clinical conferences that now draw hundreds of cli-
nicians every year were the size of a couple of schools’ clinical faculties 
today.6 To think about how far clinical legal education has come in 
forty years is truly a marvel. Much of the credit for that growth and 
stature goes to the founders and their progeny—a group Professor 
Stephen Reed has labeled the “Great Clinicians” —who fought for and 
built the programs from which all clinicians benefit.7 Social justice was 
                                                                                                                      
2 Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Scholarship and the Justice Mission, 40 Clev. St. L. Rev. 
469, 469 (1992) (“To many people, the relationship between clinical programs and the 
justice mission of American law schools is so clear as to be self-evident.”). 
3 See Margaret Martin Barry et al., Clinical Education for This Millennium: The Third Wave, 
7 Clinical L. Rev. 1, 16, 18–19 (2000) (describing the modern era of clinical legal educa-
tion beginning in the 1960s with grants from the Ford Foundation to select law schools 
and continuing into the 1970s with “development of a clinical teaching methodology”); 
Douglas A. Blaze, Déjà Vu All Over Again: Reflections on Fifty Years of Clinical Education, 64 
Tenn. L. Rev. 939, 941–42 (1997); Panel Discussion, Clinical Legal Education: Reflections on 
the Past Fifteen Years and Aspirations for the Future, 36 Cath. U. L. Rev. 337, 341 (1987). 
4 See Barry et al., supra note 3, at 10, 20. 
5 See id. at 8–9. 
6 See J.P. “Sandy” Ogilvy, Celebrating CLEPR’s 40th Anniversary: The Early Development of 
Clinical Legal Education and Legal Ethics Instruction in U.S. Law Schools, 16 Clinical L. Rev. 
1, 16 (2009). 
7 See Stephen F. Reed, Clinical Legal Education at a Generational Crossroads: A Self-Focused 
Self-Study of Self, 17 Clinical L. Rev. 243, 243 (2010); Praveen Kosuri, Clinical Legal Educa-
tion at a Generational Crossroads: X Marks the Spot, 17 Clinical L. Rev. 205, 206–07 (2010). 
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a central tenet to the modern clinical movement.8 The Great Clinicians 
brought their fight for civil rights and access to justice from the streets 
into law schools.9 Initially they continued to do the same type of work 
they did in practice but with the assistance of law students, rarely think-
ing about teaching.10 In time, however, the Great Clinicians developed 
a pedagogy that allowed students to learn more from a clinical experi-
ence than they would from simply working at a job.11 Central to that 
pedagogy were moral lessons about economic disparity, unequal access 
to the judicial system, and uneven application of laws.12 Clinicians ulti-
mately framed the pedagogy as “client-centered” lawyering, requiring 
preparation, performance, and reflection.13 The Great Clinicians de-
fined social justice, chose the types of cases their clinics would take, and 
chose the lessons they would impart to students.14 Those choices con-
scribed future clinicians who would enter clinical teaching under their 
tutelage.15 Over the decades, representing the underserved and subor-
dinated operated as the anchor for clinical legal education, almost re-
ligiously.16 If the modern clinical movement was the Church, then the 
Great Clinicians were its clergy. The message was clear: to be a good 
clinician meant believing in the Great Clinicians’ concept of social jus-
tice and inculcating students with that belief. To argue that social jus-
tice is not essential to clinical legal education is equivalent to Martin 
                                                                                                                      
8 See Barry et al., supra note 3, at 12–13; Dubin, supra note 1, at 1464–65; see also Kosuri, 
supra note 7, at 206–07 (discussing how clinical education developed out of the political 
and social atmosphere of the 1960s and 1970s); Stephen Wizner & Robert Solomon, Essay, 
Law as Politics: A Response to Adam Babich, 11 Clin. L. Rev. 473, 473 (2005) (discussing clini-
cal education in the 1960s and stating, “we believed that we were making a political deci-
sion—that lawyering on behalf of poor people meant representing the oppressed against 
entrenched interests, including the state”). 
9 See Wizner & Aiken, supra note 1, at 998. 
10 Frank Askin, A Law School Where Students Don’t Just Learn the Law, They Help Make the 
Law, 51 Rutgers L. Rev. 855, 856 (1999) (admitting that he paid little attention to teach-
ing all aspects of lawyering to the law students that worked with him in an impact litigation 
clinic); see Barry et al., supra note 3, at 9–10; Wizner & Aiken, supra note 1, at 998. 
11 See Barbara L. Bezdek, To Forge New Hammers of Justice: Deep-Six the Doing-Teaching Di-
chotomy and Embrace the Dialectic of “Doing Theory,” 4 U. Md. L.J. Race, Religion, Gender & 
Class 301, 305–06 (2004). See generally Gary Bellow, Clinical Education as Methodology, in 
Clinical Education for the Law Student: Legal Education in a Service Setting 
374 (1973) (providing the framework for modern clinical pedagogy). 
12 See Barry et al., supra note 3, at 13. 
13 See Ashar, supra note 1, at 369–70; Blaze, supra note 3, at 947–48; Wizner & Aiken, 
supra note 1, at 999. 
14 See Barry et al., supra note 3 at 12–13; Kosuri, supra note 7, at 206–07. 
15 See Kosuri, supra note 7, at 216; see also Karla Mari McKanders, Clinical Legal Educa-
tion at a Generational Crossroads: Shades of Gray, 17 Clinical L. Rev. 223, 224 (2010). 
16 See Dubin, supra note 1, at 1475. 
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Luther posting his ninety-five theses to the Castle Church door.17 
Maybe it is time for our Reformation. 
 This Article challenges the authority of the clinical clergy to con-
scribe the content and subject-matter of law school clinics. These are 
my five theses: 
  1. Clinical legal education is not the province of any one con-
stituency or ideology. 
  2. Law schools primarily exist to educate and train law stu-
dents—all law students. 
  3. Clinics are the pinnacle of experiential learning. 
  4. Clinical faculty should be empowered to create diverse 
clinical experiences for students. 
  5. Social justice is still relevant to clinical legal education. 
I. Clinical Legal Education Is Not the Province of Any  
One Constituency or Ideology 
 When the founders of modern clinical education became law 
school teachers, they were rebels—iconoclasts that challenged the staid, 
theoretical world of American law schools.18 They brought the protests, 
injustices, and turmoil of the streets into the hallowed halls of law 
schools.19 Rather than read about neutered disputes in casebooks, the 
founders of the modern clinical movement allowed students to experi-
ence firsthand the fights going on outside the law school walls.20 Ini-
tially, this appeal was enough.21 It reflected the world at that time— ac-
tivist students working with activist lawyers. Eventually the turmoil in 
the streets subsided. The fervor that brought forth the clinical move-
ment dissipated. Ford Foundation money that mandated that clinics be 
                                                                                                                      
17 See id. In the early 1500s, the Catholic Church used the practice of selling “indul-
gences,” a coupon for a rebate on penitence for sins already committed and confessed to. 
R.R. Palmer & Joel Colton, A History of the Modern World 75 (6th ed. 1984). Mar-
tin Luther was a German priest who disagreed with this practice arguing instead that re-
mission of repentance was between God and the individual, not for the clergy or Church 
to dispense, and especially not to sell. Id. In 1517 he posted his ninety-five theses to the 
Castle Church door in Wittenberg, Germany. Id. Luther challenged the belief that the 
Pope and the Church were the only sources of divine knowledge and argued that all Chris-
tians had the power to discern their own religious truths. Id. at 75–76. 
18 See Askin, supra note 10, at 857; Suzanne Valdez Carey, An Essay on the Evolution of 
Clinical Legal Education and Its Impact on Student Trial Practice, 51 Kan. L. Rev. 509, 509, 513 
(2003). 
19 See Wizner & Aiken, supra note 1, at 998. 
20 See Carey, supra note 18, at 513. 
21 See Dubin, supra note 1, at 1465–67. 
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socially progressive dried up.22 But the rebels, the iconoclasts, had be-
come comfortable in their new habitat. They had learned how to 
teach—something that they had not been trained to do.23 And they 
had an army of law students (albeit a relatively small one) to do the 
work they cared about.24 Over the next two decades these former rebels 
turned law professors channeled energy once directed at civil rights 
advances and law reform efforts toward fighting battles to entrench 
themselves in the academy.25 Students who shared their values fought 
alongside them. The battles achieved varying degrees of success but, in 
the aggregate, clinics found a permanent place in law schools.26 They 
proliferated and became part of the norm.27 Those rebels—the Great 
Clinicians—achieved much of this.28 But now, they have become the 
“establishment.” The Great Clinicians no longer challenge the status 
quo regarding clinical legal education, but rather defend it.29 They de-
fend their legacy, their sense of social justice, and their niche in the 
academy.30 Just as non-clinical faculty like to produce graduates in their 
image, so do clinical faculty.31 For the Great Clinicians, that means cul-
tivating social justice lawyers.32 But the issue is not whether to challenge 
their accomplishments or their place in history.33 The issue is whether, 
in that defense of the past, clinicians are failing multiple segments of 
students by limiting the types of clinical experiences offered to them.34 
                                                                                                                      
 
22 See id. 
23 See Wizner & Aiken, supra note 1, at 1003. 
24 See, e.g., Stephen Wizner, Beyond Skills Training, 7 Clinical L. Rev. 327, 334–35 
(2001). 
25 See Blaze, supra note 3, at 958–59. 
26 See Barry et al., supra note 3, at 32; Blaze, supra note 3, at 961; Dubin, supra note 1, at 
1462. 
27 See Barry et al., supra note 3, at 32; Blaze, supra note 3, at 961; Dubin, supra note 1, at 
1462. 
28 See Kosuri, supra note 7, at 207. 
29 See Dubin, supra note 1, at 1466; McKanders, supra note 15, at 235. 
30 See Wizner & Aiken, supra note 1, at 1001–02. 
31 See Reed, supra note 7, at 253–54. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. 
34 See id. at 250–52. I once compared the modern clinical movement to a house built 
by the movement’s founders. The founders not only identified space to build their house, 
but they designed, furnished, and maintained it. It may have begun as a temporary dwell-
ing that was never intended to last but, through the years, the founders strengthened and 
renovated it. Originally, the site of the house was on the edge of town and away from the 
main street. Invited guests needed to travel to get there. This was fine for the founders 
because they were not interested in entertaining lots of people. Instead, they wanted peo-
ple that were like them; who were interested in the food they cooked and the drinks they 
served—people who wanted to stay awhile. Gradually, the town began to expand. As it did, 
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 Though the Great Clinicians would likely not claim that they own 
all of clinical legal education, they have co-opted it and are in construc-
tive possession of it. They are clinic directors, senior faculty members, 
and hiring committee chairpersons. They are the gatekeepers to the 
academy. As a result, there is a self-perpetuating aspect to clinical 
teachers just as there is for non-clinical teachers: we hire folks that look 
like us.35 In the early years, this approach made a lot of sense; there 
were not very many clinical professors to begin with and the few that 
did exist needed comrades in arms.36 Decades of building those ranks 
with people who shared the ideology, however, has resulted in an intel-
lectual homogeneity. 
 We assume too much, discuss too little, and dismiss alternative per-
spectives. Politically, we defend our territory.37 The Great Clinicians ex-
plicitly staked our place in the academy with social justice markers.38 
Movement of those markers or encroachment by foreigners is consid-
ered trespass on sacred ground. Clinical faculty fear being displaced. 
Going forward, however, we must shed that territoriality to enhance our 
position in the institution by promoting more clinical opportunities.39 
II. Law Schools Primarily Exist to Educate and Train 
Law Students—All Law Students 
 Law school is first and foremost about educating students. Even 
though faculty members often use their positions to pursue their own 
social and political agendas (both inside and outside their institutions), 
without students, there are no law schools. Thus, the fundamental goal 
of every law school faculty member should be to educate students as 
ably as possible. The genius of Christopher Columbus Langdell— ap-
pointed Dean of Harvard Law School in 1870—was not in developing 
                                                                                                                      
the clinical house began to receive visitors. Where once it drew mostly those who shared 
the founders’ taste for the wilderness, it then drew people who just wanted to drop in. The 
visitors had heard that the founders served meals rich in sustenance (much better than the 
town cafeteria). The founders, however, were not so keen on these new visitors. The foun-
ders suspected they were in their house for all the wrong reasons. They wanted the meat, 
but they didn’t want to drink the punch. The punch, for the founders, was the essential 
part of the meal. It may be that the clinical community has outgrown a single house. The 
Great Clinicians anchored a new neighborhood featuring an appealing style of architec-
ture favored by new residents seeking their own living space to entertain their own guests. 
This is a success story, not a failure. Kosuri, supra note 7, at 216. 
35 See Reed, supra note 7, at 253–54. 
36 See Wizner & Aiken, supra note 1, at 998. 
37 See Dubin, supra note 1, at 1475. 
38 See Reed, supra note 7, at 243, 253–54. 
39 See Ashar, supra note 1, at 411. 
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the case method of legal education, but rather in developing a method 
that was so efficient as to make law schools more profitable.40 The case 
method allowed education of large numbers of students in a methodical 
and replicable manner.41 Clinical legal education, on the other hand, is 
relatively inefficient.42 It requires more time, more professors, and adds 
the complexity of real life into the equation. Yet, the return on invest-
ment for clinical education, at least to students, is arguably greater than 
the return acquired through traditional, large, Socratically-taught lec-
ture classes.43 Almost eighty years after early-twentieth century scholar 
and professor Jerome Frank asked Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, ex-
periential learning has begun to permeate doctrinal classrooms.44 In-
creasingly, podium faculty are contextualizing doctrine by introducing 
lawyering.45 This is a great development—much in line with the 2007 
Carnegie Report’s urging to better integrate theory and practice.46 Pre-
sumably, incorporation of practical lawyering skills into these courses is 
done because it enhances students’ education.47 
 Clinical professors must also remember that educating students is 
the primary goal, and service to clients the second order. Of course, 
clinicians must maintain their professional responsibility to clients once 
representation commences.48 Clinics, however, should let their teach-
ing goals drive client selection, rather than the reverse.49 Clinical fac-
ulty that use clinics as personal legal services firms run the risk of using 
law school resources for purposes other than the educational mission. 
Keeping priorities in order mitigates this risk. 
 To satisfy this educational priority, clinical opportunities should 
exist for every law student who wants one. The notion that clinics are 
                                                                                                                      
40 Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Not Clinical Education?, 16 Clinical L. Rev. 35, 38 (2009); 
Ogilvy, supra note 6, at 3–4. 
41 See Chemerinsky, supra note 40, at 38. 
42 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education—A 21st-Century Perspective, 34 J. 
Legal Educ. 612, 617 (1984); Chemerinsky, supra note 40, at 38. 
43 See Amsterdam, supra note 42, at 618. 
44 See William M. Sullivan et al., Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Pro-
fession of Law 7–8 (2007) [hereinafter Carnegie Report]; Jerome Frank, Why Not a 
Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 907, 917 (1933). The 2007 book Educating Lawyers: 
Preparation for the Profession of Law was published by the Carnegie Foundation and is com-
monly referred to as the Carnegie Report. 
45 See, e.g., Carnegie Report, supra note 44, at 38–39. 
46 See id. at 12. 
47 See id. at 13. 
48 See David F. Chavkin, Am I My Client’s Lawyer?: Role Definition and the Clinical Supervi-
sor, 51 SMU L. Rev. 1507, 1513 (1998). 
49 See Adrienne Jennings Lockie, Encouraging Reflection on and Involving Students in the 
Decision to Begin Representation, 16 Clinical L. Rev. 357, 365–67 (2010). 
338 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 32:331 
only for “public interest” students or special factions of students must be 
abandoned. Every law student should feel welcome in a clinic regardless 
of ideology, background, or interest. This is not to suggest that most cli-
nicians overtly prevent students who do not share their ideology from 
enrolling in their clinics, but tacit signals may nevertheless make many 
students feel uncomfortable with clinics that espouse a different ideol-
ogy, or worse, fear being judged by professors. Additionally, some stu-
dents may still be forming their ideology; others may not have one at all. 
Students may be dissuaded from working in a clinic for fear that clinical 
faculty will dogmatically preach rather than allow students to formulate 
their own beliefs and values. Incorporating more students in clinics, 
however, will only enhance the learning experience for everyone. More 
varied perspectives, greater interaction, and more discussion will only 
lead to profounder understanding of issues, people, and values. 
III. Clinics Are the Pinnacle of Experiential Learning 
 The greatest contribution of clinical legal education is not in creat-
ing a haven for public interest-oriented law students or in promoting 
social justice causes, but rather in a methodology that teaches students 
how to learn from experience, whatever that experience may be.50 For 
ninety years, various groups have called for greater experiential learn-
ing opportunities in law schools.51 In the midst of the greatest eco-
nomic recession in a generation and a contracting legal marketplace 
affecting all law schools and every type of law practice, student demand 
for practical legal training is understandably heightened.52 Law school 
administrators are already responding to new pressures by increasing 
the number of simulation courses and externships.53 Clinics are the top 
                                                                                                                      
 
50 See Jeanne Charn, Service and Learning: Reflections on Three Decades of the Lawyering 
Process at Harvard Law School, 10 Clinical L. Rev. 75, 77–78 (2003); Jennifer Howard, 
Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer” Through Experience, 2 Clinical L. Rev. 167, 176 (1995). 
51 Chemerinsky, supra note 40, at 37 (chronicling the 1921 study supported by the 
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Jerome Frank’s 1933 article extol-
ling a “clinical law school,” a 1944 AALS report edited by Karl Llewellyn, the 1992 MacCrate 
Report, and the 2007 Carnegie Report). 
52 See John Henry Schlegel, Walt Was Right, 51 J. Legal Educ. 599, 608 (2001). 
53 See, e.g., Law School Dean to Serve Second Five-Year Term, Duke Chron. (Nov. 16, 2011), 
http://dukechronicle.com/article/law-school-dean-serve-second-five-year-term (describing 
how Duke School of Law Dean David Levi has “focused on preparing students with profes-
sional training, through externships, clinics and courtroom simulation courses”); Lawyering 
Skills Center: Clinics, Externships, & Simulation Courses, N.Y. Law Sch., http://www.nyls.edu/ 
academics/jd_programs/lawyering_skills_externships (last visited Feb. 17, 2012) (explaining 
that “[s]ince 1991, . . . experiential learning ha[s] increased significantly and [is] now an 
integral part of the NYLS curriculum”); Simulation Courses, The Catholic Univ. of Am. Co-
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of the pyramid in terms of experiential learning. Clinicians should em-
brace this leading role and find ways to bring that superior experience 
to more students. 
 In slow economies, students need to develop marketable practice 
skills.54 In years past, law firms invested time and money to develop 
young lawyers who would repay that investment by generating many 
years of billable hours. Law firms now, however, demand associates who 
can hit the ground running before they depart to another job, often 
within the first five years of practice.55 This change in the market has 
pushed practical training downstream to law schools.56 
 For law school administrators, simulation courses and externships 
are far cheaper alternatives to clinics. A clinic, however, offers a richer 
experience that cannot be replicated by other experiential learning. 
Clinical pedagogy is the multi-faceted jewel in the crown of clinical le-
gal education. Preparation, performance, and reflection are key ele-
ments to any clinical experience regardless of subject-matter. The sig-
nature feature of clinical pedagogy is the students’ placement in the 
primary role of representative, where faculty members use those ex-
periences as focal points for further inquiry. This pedagogy can be ap-
plied in any clinical experience and unlocks discussions about varied 
political, economic, and social issues. Clinical faculty should bring that 
experience to more students regardless of whether it explicitly includes 
traditional notions of social justice. 
IV. Clinical Faculty Should Be Empowered to Create 
Diverse Clinical Experiences for Students 
 Legal realists like Jerome Frank envisioned clinical cases to include 
more than just issues of poverty law.57 Clinicians argue that it is impor-
tant to expose students to social justice issues in clinics because most 
law students would not otherwise have any experience with under-
                                                                                                                      
lumbus Sch. of Law, http://www.law.edu/clinics/cle/legal-simulation.cfm (last updated 
Apr. 12, 2011) (“In addition to externships and client-based, representational clinics, the law 
school offers an ever-increasing number of simulation courses that permit students to learn 
and improve a variety of essential lawyering skills.”). 
54 See Daniel Thies, Rethinking Legal Education in Hard Times: The Recession, Practical Le-
gal Education, and the New Job Market, 59 J. Legal Educ. 598, 602, 605 (2010). 
55 NALP Found. for Law Career Research & Educ., Update on Associate Attri-
tion: Findings from a National Study of Law Firm Associate Hiring and Depar-
tures—Calendar Year 2010, at 4 (2010) (stating that “70% of 2010 departing associates 
left their firms within five or fewer years of their arrival”); Thies, supra note 54, at 605–06. 
56 Thies, supra note 54, at 611. 
57 See Frank, supra note 44, at 917–18. 
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served communities or poverty law.58 This assumes a lot about law stu-
dents, but even if true, it deliberately excludes an equally valuable 
learning experience for students lacking exposure to many other stra-
tums of American society. 
 The question is why should law school clinics be the exclusive prov-
ince of one over the other? One could imagine a slew of law school clin-
ics not rooted in traditional poverty law or social justice issues. Some 
examples include intellectual property, securities, venture finance, trusts 
and estates, tax, and bankruptcy. Many of these are related to business, 
though they may include litigation as well as transactional work. Though 
ideologically neutral on their face, one could create a social justice 
agenda to attach to most of these clinics, but the question is why is that 
necessary? Scholars often depict the clinical dichotomy as one of skills 
versus social justice, but this overly simplifies what it is to be a lawyer.59 
 Clinicians tend to marry lawyering values with social justice val-
ues.60 This is simply not accurate. There are, for example, a whole host 
of values activated by the lawyer-client relationship. Any clinic that in-
volves clients will involve lawyering competencies that naturally involve 
more than technical skills. The question is how those competencies are 
taught—through social justice cases or some other types of cases. Law-
yers are taught to zealously advocate for their clients. The professional 
rules of conduct carefully distinguish a client’s beliefs from that of the 
lawyer. Yet, to assert that the only values worth holding are social justice 
values removes the neutral-partisan ethic that is central to the profes-
sion. 
 Furthermore, different approaches and notions of social justice 
are visible through legal practice. In litigation, there are lawyers on 
each side of a dispute. One side is often painted as the “bad guy” when, 
in fact, the conflict is more nuanced. In an ideal world, students would 
be taught about each perspective. Instead, clinicians tend to champion 
their own paradigms and values, dismissing alternative views. The no-
tion that if one does not agree with the clinical teacher then he or she 
is “against” social justice is dogmatic. Instead, both parties may simply 
have different notions of justice or a different hierarchy of values. For 
law students, this is an important point. Should the goal of clinical edu-
cation be to inculcate students so that they see the world the way clini-
cal faculty view it and champion their causes, or should it be to em-
                                                                                                                      
58 See Dubin, supra note 1, at 1476–77. 
59 See, e.g., Wizner, supra note 24, at 327, 330, 332. 
60 See, e.g., Dubin, supra note 1, at 1475, 1477–78; Wizner, supra note 24, at 329–31. 
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power students to develop their own understanding of the world and 
their own values? If the latter, then how must the social justice model 
be incorporated into clinics? 
 Most clinicians rightly acknowledge that only a few clinical students 
will go into public interest careers. As such, most of them are in clinics 
to learn transferable competencies. Social justice clinics teach many of 
those competencies, but so can many other types of clinics. Failure to 
recognize this possibility risks sending a message that the only legitimate 
clinic is one rooted in social justice, even if another might be a better 
teaching vehicle. 
 A venture finance clinic serves as a good example. Setting student 
practice rules aside, this type of clinic would, on its face, be devoid of 
traditional social justice issues.61 Students would represent businesses 
who are seeking to acquire early stage investment from financial spon-
sors. The legal work might involve negotiation, document and financial 
review, and contract drafting. Additionally, students must understand 
power dynamics between parties, understand various motivations, and 
learn how to manipulate them to the client’s advantage. A successful 
representation results in a client receiving funding. This clinic is by and 
large devoid of social justice. But why is it not a legitimate clinical offer-
ing? What is being taught is much more than “skills.” The richness of 
the experience is not in drafting the agreements, but in learning what 
motivates people and how to align interests to achieve a desired out-
come. Professional ethics are still triggered, though not necessarily in 
the social justice context. Learning these things in the context of cor-
porate and securities law may in fact benefit a student’s career more 
than representing a wronged social security beneficiary. Regardless of 
the clinical context, non-social-justice-oriented clinics should be valid 
offering for students, thereby allowing them to choose their own pur-
suits in the clinical arena. 
 Students—with the right information—are quite capable of dis-
cerning the differences between various practical experiences. Law 
schools can assist by highlighting the spectrum of lessons presented in 
each type of experience from simulation to live-client clinic. Similarly, 
with full information, students can discern the differences between 
non-social justice clinics and social justice ones. They can prioritize 
their own values and learning objectives. 
                                                                                                                      
61 I purposely do not address the student practice rules in this essay for three reasons. 
First, every state has their own. Second, they may not apply to all clinical experiences. Third, 
if law schools had the inclination to modify them to accommodate a particular type of clinic, 
I have faith that they could figure out how. 
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 Clinical legal education and clinical educators are not a monolith. 
When the modern clinical movement was established, clinicians 
brought a wide assortment of cases into the clinical fold.62 Though the 
subject matter may have been the personal preference of the instruc-
tors, law schools gave them the freedom and trust to turn whatever 
those cases were into rich educational experiences. Clinics should rees-
tablish that academic freedom. Every clinician should be free to de-
velop teaching objectives and design clinics without mandates about 
the type of case or a social justice perspective. Schools must set the cur-
riculum so that clinics do not compete or overlap in subject matter, but 
they should not tell professors what to teach or how to teach it. Law 
schools should hire faculty they trust to educate their students and then 
give them the power to do so. No school would do otherwise in a con-
tracts course or a torts course, but clinics prescribe social justice. 
V. Social Justice Is Still Relevant 
 Despite how it may appear, I believe in social justice. I even believe 
that law school clinics should be free to champion social justice causes. 
In fact, I am firmly engaged in achieving social impact through the work 
of my clinic—a transactional clinic at the University of Pennsylvania.63 
 Social justice clinics can provide rich, meaningful experiences to 
students while allowing them to develop transferable practice compe-
tencies that will be useful to them years into practice. I have worked to 
make my clinic such an experience. But, to be clear, when clinical fac-
ulty champion a social cause, it is almost always their cause. Law stu-
dents do not have a say in what it is. My clinic is the only transactional 
clinic at my institution. As such, I attract students who wish to explore 
transactional careers in corporate and securities, intellectual property, 
and tax practices. I must make sure that my focus on social impact does 
not impede my goal to train and educate great transactional lawyers. 
 Despite claims to the contrary, the social justice mission in law 
school clinics is alive and well.64 Educating students about economic 
disparities, unequal application of the law, and abuses of power are im-
portant lessons. The strength of these lessons and the valuable service 
provided to clients will sustain social justice clinics regardless of how 
                                                                                                                      
62 See Wizner, supra note 24, at 330. 
63 Praveen Kosuri, “Impact” in 3D—Maximizing Impact Through Transactional Clinics, 18 
Clinical L. Rev. 1, 30 (2011). 
64 Dubin, supra note 1, at 1474 (concluding that the demise of social justice impera-
tives in law school clinics is premature). 
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many other offerings enter the fold. Clinicians need to have confidence 
in the pedagogical model and not fear the introduction of new clinics 
with non-traditional subject matter. Independent of the subject matter 
of a clinic, it is lawyering values that we should care most about. 
Conclusion 
 I thought about starting this Article with an apology and a dis-
claimer—an apology to those that would be offended by what I have to 
say and a disclaimer to let folks know that I do believe in social justice. 
The fact that I considered these things highlights the reason why clini-
cians need more ideological neutrality in clinical programs and dis-
course. Social justice causes are laudable and incredibly important. I 
am not advocating that social justice should be removed from all clin-
ics. Instead, I espouse a more expansive and inclusive view of what clin-
ics can do for law students. Experiential learning is here to stay and 
clinical legal education in particular has been a tremendous success. 
Clinical pedagogy enhances experiential learning in a way that simula-
tion courses and externships do not. Clinicians should embrace that 
success and look to share it with more students. 
 We live in an increasingly factionalized and partisan world. When 
clinicians champion one world view to the exclusion of another, we are 
just aiding in that factionalization. Law schools are meant to allow stu-
dents to explore competing theories and develop their own ideologies. 
Clinics that are intellectually and ideologically diverse further that mis-
sion. Education of students should drive service choices, but each fac-
ulty member should have the freedom and independence to structure 
and design their clinics according to their teaching objectives. 
 As more students look for competitive advantages when they enter 
the workforce, more will be driven to clinics. Clinicians should strive to 
provide a portfolio of opportunities that appeal to a wide array of stu-
dents. Even if clinicians think that social justice clinics are the Cadillac 
sedans of clinical education, there is nothing wrong with offering a 
Chevy pick-up truck, too. Different experiences can serve different 
purposes. There is no reason to preempt one over another merely be-
cause of personal preference or ideology. 
 Martin Luther ended up breaking from the Catholic Church. He 
was unable to convince the Church to concede that its followers had 
the power to attain salvation on their own. Clinical legal education, 
however, does not need a Reformation. It needs to avoid one by enter-
taining new perspectives and alternatives to social justice clinics while 
still preserving the core of the modern movement—its pedagogical 
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method. In my estimation, law school administrators will begin to pres-
sure clinical programs to expand their offerings to include non-social 
justice clinics. If clinical programs do not take proactive control over 
that process, clinical educators risk a schism brought about by a Refor-
mation thrust upon us. 
